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Wildlife Emotions: Animal Rights 
as Examined Through A 
Cognitivist Lens 
By K. L. Schultz 
 
Abstract: ​The aim of this article is to revisit and redefine the scope of a Kantian rights-based                  
theory to include non-human animals. Generally, rights-based theories are predicated on           
a Kantian deontology that excludes all but rational subjects from possessing of basic             
rights. Historically, non-human animals—once thought to act on impulse and desire           
alone—have been excluded from rights-based considerations. However, more recent         
literature from emotions theorist Martha Nussbaum suggests an alternative picture for           
non-human animals. Cognitivist theories like Nussbaum’s, alongside intensive scientific         
research, support the notion that non-human animals show signs of intentionality and            
possess the capacity to emote. If Nussbaum’s theory is correct that emotions are indeed              
intelligent, potentially rational, evaluative judgments, then non-human animals are in fact           
rational agents. Therefore, non-human animals should be granted limited protections          
under a deontological moral framework. Ultimately, I shall detail what these limited            




I. The Inner Lives of Non-Human Animals 
 
Historically, there has been much debate over the cognitive capacities of                     
non-human animals. Such inquiry often surrounds the following question: do                   
non-human animals, as they experience the world around them, experience an                     
inner life much like that of humans? Today, many researchers have found that                         
non-human animals possess the capacity for innovation. For example, multiple                   
studies suggest the guppy fish is an innovative forager. Furthermore, there seems                       
to be a direct correlation between innovation and continued motivation. It was                       
concluded that guppies that had shown innovative tendencies once were more                     
likely to be innovative again, therefore suggesting a personality trait.                   
1
Interestingly, female guppies and guppies of smaller sizes tended to be more                       
innovative, as perhaps both groups of guppies had more motivation to do so. For                           
the smaller guppies, competition for the food source might have been a                       
motivating factor, and for female guppies, a larger quantity of foraged food leads                         
to successful reproduction.  
The guppy fish is not the only non-human animal to show signs of                         
innovation. Chimpanzees have been known to make their own tools using grass,                       
twigs, and stones. Dolphins, who are also known for being extremely intelligent ,                         
2
have been known to create and use tools as well. The bottlenose dolphin not only                             
3
recognizes their own reflection in a mirror but, with training, they can also                         
comprehend language and respond to vocal commands. Perhaps the most notable                     
expression of bottlenose dolphins’ creativity and intelligence is their innovative                   
tool making. Bottlenose dolphins have been known to tear off sponges to use                         
them as protection for their long snouts—or rostrums—when foraging for food. 
Despite the evidence, however, there are those who still question whether                     
these kinds of examples actually reveal that non-human animals have cognitive                     
capacities like us. Followers of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and B.F. Skinner                       
have held opposing views while nevertheless advancing theories that focus on the                       
notion that non-human animals are not exactly rationally autonomous creatures ,                     
and that their behavior has been merely conditioned through prolonged exposure,                     
1K.N. Laland and S.M. Reader, “Foraging Innovation in the Guppy,” ​Animal Behavior​ 57, no. 2 
(1998): 331-340. 
2 Christophe Boesch and Hedwige Boesch, “Tool Use and Tool Making in Wild Chimpanzees,” 
Folia Primatol​, 54 (1990): 86-99. 
3Stan A. Kuczaj and Holli C. Eskelinen, “The ‘Creative Dolphin’ Revisited: What Do Dolphins 
Do When Asked to Vary Their Behavior,” ​Animal Behavior and Cognition​,​ ​1, no. 1 (2014): 66-75. 
1 
leading them to respond to select stimuli. These theories paint a picture of the                           
4
inner-lives of non-human animals as largely un-rational automatons, acting on                   
instinct and conditioning alone. Still, even if non-human animals are for the most                         
part acting on some combination of instinct and behavioral conditioning, what                     
about emotions?  
Charles Darwin was the first scientist to systematically study non-human                   
animal emotions. Hr suggested that non-human animals do, in fact, share similar                       
emotional experiences to humans and that there is perhaps a continuation between                       
human and non-human animal emotions, one that is similar in kind, though                       
different in degree. Darwin’s pioneering work in ​The Expression of the Emotions                       5
in Man and Animals ​was a formal catalyst for rekindling the conversation on the                           
age-old inquiry of the emotional lives of non-human animals.   
6
In more recent years, advancements in neuroimaging technology have                 
made non-invasive research of non-human animals more accessible, and scientists                   
have been able to gain a better understanding of what the inner-lives of                         
non-human animals look like from a strictly objective and scientific standpoint.                     
Field research has also played a huge part in collecting scientific data on                         
non-human animal emotions in the wild. Wildlife biologists have observed not                     
only what they take to be fear, anger, and joy in non-human animals, but also                             
more emotionally complex expressions like empathy. Non-human animals have                 
been found to empathize with members of their own species as well as with those                             
belonging to a different species altogether. In one case, a lost woman, who                         
suffered from poor vision, was rescued and protected by a herd of elephants. She                           
was found with the elephants guarding her as “they had encased her in a sort of                               
cage of branches to protect her from hyenas.” Humpback whales have also been                         
7
known to express cross-species empathy. In one documented case, a humpback                     
whale swept a seal out of the water and onto its back to save it from being hunted                                   
by killer whales. Expressions of empathy suggest a strong disposition for                     
emotionality in non-human animals, as empathy is seemingly more complex than                     
the basic emotions such as fear, anger, and joy. 
4Marc Bekoff, “Animal Emotions: Exploring Passionate Natures,” ​BioScience​, 50, no. 10 (Oct. 
2000): 861-870. 
5Charles Darwin, ​The Expressions of the Emotions in Mand and Animals​ (John Murray, 1872). 
6S Paul Ekman, “Darwin’s Contributions to Our Understanding of Emotional Expressions,” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London: Biological Science​, 364, no. 12 (Dec. 
2009): 3349-3451. 





This article attempts to establish an argument for non-human animal rights                     
on a Kantian basis, despite the traditional rejection of such rights. In §II, I will                             
paint a much more colorful picture of the inner-lives of non-human animals. I will                           
point to how the empirical evidence for non-human animal emotions, when                     
applied to Martha Nussbaum's cognitivist theory of emotions, logically entails                   
that non-human animals are rationally autonomous, as they engage in cognitively                     
evaluative judgments to which they act accordingly. In §III, I will provide a                         
defense of cognitivism in light of some challenging objections to the theory. In                         
§IV, I will examine a Kantian rights-based theory, ultimately suggesting that                     
emotional cognitivism supplies the premises needed for a limited extension of                     
basic rights to non-human animals. Lastly, in §V, I will discuss what this would                           
mean for our ethical obligations to select members of the wildlife community, and                         
consider what protections non-human animals should be entitled to. 
 
II. Martha Nussbaum’s Cognitivist Account of Emotion 
 
If the empirical evidence explored above does show us that non-human                     
animals emote, what else might this imply? In other words, what does it mean to                             
say that an animal is emoting? Emotions theorist Martha Nussbaum’s cognitivist                     
revision of the Ancient Greek Stoic view offers a metaphysical account of                       
emotions. On this account, Nussbaum argues that emotions are cognitively                   
evaluative judgments that include, but do not necessarily require, an affective                     
state in the agent who emotes. According to Nussbaum, when one is emoting,                         
8
they are judging the evaluative quality of some object, and what ultimately gives                         
rise to a particular emotional state is not the identity of the object we evaluate ,                               
but the way in which we evaluate it . Lastly, being eudaimonistic in nature,                           
9
Nussbaum argues that emotions are in direct correspondence with the agent’s                     
flourishing. In ​Upheavals of Thought ​, she expands her cognitivist theory to                     10
include non-human animals, stating: “experimentalists give us reason to conclude                   
that animals are emotional, and that their emotions, like ours, are appraisals of the                           
world, as it relates to their well-being.”   
11
Nussbaum points to a few non-human animal case studies to strengthen                     
her inclusion of non-human animal emotionality. One such reference points to the                       
8Martha Nussbaum, “Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance,” in ​Thinking about 
Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions​, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 273. 
9Nussbaum, “Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance,” 275-276. 
10Ibid., p. 277.  
11Martha Nussbaum, ​Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions​ (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 119. 
3 
philosopher George Pitcher, who has cultivated a large body of work in regard to                           
the intentionality of human emotions. In ​The Dogs Who Came To Stay ​, Pitcher                         
examines the colorful lives of his own dogs, Lupa and Remus, and argues that                           
their actions and behavior seem to possess a similar intentionality. Nussbaum                     
notes that the biography “pursues no theoretical agenda, although it displays the                       
same observation capacities that are used to good theoretical ends in the                       
philosophical work.” In his findings, Pitcher suggests that dogs are indeed                     
12
capable of a type of “unguarded and unqualified” love that even humans often                         
don’t possess, as the conditionality of love is perhaps unique to the human                         
experience. In his work, Pitcher is able to successfully make the distinction of                         
13
how the bond with Lupa and Remus looks much different than an attachment that                           
is purely instrumental as a means of survival.  
Upon returning home, Pitcher is greeted with warm affection, and, when                     
there is physical distance between himself and his canine companions, Lupa and                       
Remus explicitly show signs of psychological distress. Beyond an outward                   
expression of their own interests, they remarkably seem to have an investment in                         
Pitcher’s wellbeing, as they actively try to comfort him when he is feeling low.                           
This extension of compassion seems to exhibit intentionality and demands us to                       
recognize their pursuits and evaluative judgments as intelligent and indeed                   
other-regarding. The psychological work of other-regarding expresses intelligent               
intentionality, thought, deliberation, and care for another’s well-being, and stands                   
on its own without room for human projection. If certain non-human animals have                         
the mental capacity to extend beyond their own experience and possess the ability                         
to make intelligent, evaluative judgments in terms of the well-being of others,                       
then it is reasonable to assume that they have the capacity to make evaluative                           
judgments regarding themselves. If Nussbaum’s cognitivist theory of emotion is                   
correct, we must acknowledge that since members of the wildlife community have                       
the capacity to actively make intelligent evaluative judgments towards both                   
themselves and others, then they are capable of emoting in these ways.  
 
III. Defending the Cognitivist View 
 
The general public’s take on emotional experiences is typically intuitive in                     
nature and looks very different than Nussbaum’s cognitivist theory. When people                     
are asked to describe what an emotion ​is​, their responses typically follow suit with                           
the popular belief that emotions manifest themselves as ​feelings​. It is also                       
commonly entertained that emotions are whimsical in nature, even unpredictable                   
12Nussbaum, ​Upheavals of Thought​, 120. 
13Ibid., p. 123. 
4 
at times, as they seem to arrive out of thin air, appearing and disappearing                           
effortlessly. Essentially, it is widely accepted that emotions, perhaps, are                   
something we have little control over, expressing themselves through bodily                   
sensations. Given the large body of diverse theories and the philosophical                     
literature regarding emotions, it would be unrealistic to address them all.                     
Nevertheless, in defense of the cognitivist theory, I will address some popular                       
criticisms. 
In the case of Lupa and Remus, one might raise the concern that perhaps                           
Pitcher is anthropomorphizing the experience of his beloved dogs. In fact,                     
Nussbaum herself cautions that we must refer to detailed histories of interaction                       
and observation of the animal under study to ensure that our conclusions don’t fall                           
victim to the “twin pitfalls of reductionism and anthropocentrism.” The absence                     
14
of any self-reporting evidence with regards to non-human animal emotions does                     
present a significant limitation and challenge. Nevertheless, as Nussbaum                 
15
herself retorts, “there’s always room for skepticism about these attributions of                     
intelligence and emotion to animals. But at this point, it is useful to remind                           
ourselves that our attribution of emotion to other human beings itself involves                       
projection that goes beyond the evidence.” Nussbaum seems to concede that the                       
16
intuitive charge of anthropomorphism may be one that cannot be satisfactorily                     
overcome at this time but we must also recognize that the very idea behind this                             
objection applies to interpersonal claims of emotionality as well. Therefore, one                     
cannot reject emotional cognitivism as mere projection without saying the same                     
of interpersonal attributions of emotionality in humans. If we can take it for                         
granted that other people really have emotional experiences, then the objection                     
loses its force. 
One might also object that a non-human animal, such as a dog, cannot be                           
engaging in evaluative judgments, such as “fear,” or what might be linguistically                       
conveyed as the evaluative judgment, “I am in danger.” This is because so many                           
dogs exhibit what looks like fearful behavior in circumstances where they are                       
clearly not in any actual danger. Imagine a dog that continues to bark with “fear”                             
long after a stranger has innocuously walked across their yard. The dog begins                         
frantically running around the house, searching every room and looking out every                       
14Ibid​.​, 120. The potential oversimplification in non-human animal research, studying specific 
parts to create a larger narrative as well as human tendency to project our own values and 
emotions onto the​ ​experience of non-human animals, are two common challenges that scientists 
have to take into consideration when performing field studies.  
15Acknowledging the communication barriers between non-human animals and humans that exist,                     
wildlife biologists often have to rely on rigorous long-term observational field research to study                           
the emotional life of non-human animals to supplement the absence of testimony. 
16Ibid​.,​ p. 124. 
5 
window. Given the absence of any real threat, are we not just projecting our own                             
evaluative judgments concerning danger onto a dog whose behavior looks similar                     
to our own fearful behavior? If so, then what’s really happening is nothing more                           
than a prolonged affective state that is either instinctual or conditioned.  
Nevertheless, this objection does not sufficiently preclude the possibility                 
that the dog is, in fact, making such a cognitively evaluative judgment, albeit in                           
its own comparatively ignorant way. We might consider how the dog keeps                       
checking every room while tracing the perimeter of the house so as to convince                           
itself that there really is no threat still looming in the area. Perhaps it just takes the                                 
dog longer to reach the evaluative conclusion that their territory is safe, ultimately                         
allaying its fear. Thus, the objection is a non-starter. In fact, it bears its own                             
anthropomorphic tendencies by projecting onto the dog an undue level of                     
competence that should not be expected of them simply because we would expect                         
it of ourselves.  
Another significant challenge for the cognitivist account is the idea of                     
recalcitrant emotions. Philosophers Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson state that                   
an emotion is recalcitrant when it “exists despite the agent’s making a judgment                         
that is in tension with it.” In cases of recalcitrance, the individual emoting                         
17
continues to do so despite an expressed belief to the contrary. A commonly cited                           
example concerns cases where individuals show a recalcitrant fear of flying while                       
being able to express the belief that flying is not, in fact, dangerous. So how could                               
they logically be holding an evaluative belief that flying is dangerous and yet not                           
dangerous at the same time? It must be that fear is not actually a cognitively                             
evaluative judgment but some other tendency altogether.  
Nevertheless, we can make sense of recalcitrant emotions on a cognitivist                     
account. Recalcitrant emotion objections like this happen to consider                 
circumstances that take into account statistical averages. However, the recalcitrant                   
objection fails to acknowledge the distinction between the statistically normative                   
assessments of danger and agent-relative assessments of dangers, which include a                     
separate variety of factors in its overall assessment. So, for example, the prospect                         
of dying in a car crash while commuting to work in Nevada might have a                             
statistical average of about 1/10,000, which, barring all other considerations,                   
seems extremely low to moderately low in terms of statistically normative                     
assessments of danger. Nevertheless, take a situation where the statistical average                     
is the same—say a 10,000-piece box of candies where you happen to know that                           
one of the pieces of candies contains a lethal dose of cyanide. The prospect of just                               
trying a piece of candy might suddenly induce the evaluative judgments of fear, in                           
17Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion,” ​Real Institute 
of Philosophy Supplement​, 52 (2003): 124.  
6 
the agent-relative sense of the term, given one’s own psychological profile,                     
personal experiences, skills, prospects, and alternative interests that might factor                   
into the equation. These factors can also explain why the opposite can hold in                           
cases where the statistically normative assessments report that a certain activity is                       
highly dangerous (e.g., high rise tight-rope walking over a certain distance), and                       
yet, for some individuals with certain psychological profiles, personal                 
experiences, skills, prospects, and alternative interests, the agent-relative               
evaluative judgment ultimately expresses itself with equanimity.  
D’Arms and Jacobson present a case where an individual is afraid to fly                         
despite being aware of the statistical data that flying is safer than traveling by                           
automobile. Nevertheless, this recalcitrant fear of flying might be stemming from                     
an agent-relative sense of the term that factors the agent’s own psychological                       
profile (perhaps a history of low self-confidence), personal experiences (perhaps                   
they have a history of watching hours of terrifying plane crash footage), prospects                         
(perhaps they lust for their own life more than the average person), and alternative                           
interests (they enjoy driving). Therefore, an individual who knows what the                     
statistics say about the dangers of flying might agree that flying is not dangerous                           
in the statistically normative sense of the term, and yet still evaluate the prospect                           
of flying as too dangerous for ​them in the agent-relative sense of the term.                           
Granted, the judgment may seem odd, but it can’t be considered the same as a                             
simultaneous belief in ​p​ and ​not-p. 
At the very least, this distinction requires more to be said of the agent’s                           
own thinking and personal experiences in order to explain their own                     
agent-relative assessments in contrast to the statistically normative assessments.                 
Lastly, these agent-relative conditions might also account for the effectiveness of                     
exposure therapy, as the agent is able to temper their fear with more positive                           
evaluative judgments that come along with enhancing their own sense of personal                       
experience and self-confidence regarding the object in question, giving the                   
individual a greater sense of control over the situation. Practicing tight-rope                     
walking for years is, in one sense, a form of exposure therapy that can allow a                               
person to make the kinds of agent-relative evaluative judgments that go beyond                       
what they know is rationally considered to be safe in the statistically normative                         
sense.  
One might object to this response by considering an alternative case where                       
the emotion of pride is expressed and where the agent has no good reason to                             
believe that they have done anything worthy of merit. But in the face of judgment,                             
people do not always give an honest self-report. Therefore, in cases of “pride,” it                           
is important to distinguish whether the expression is being deceptively performed                     
or if it is, in fact, a genuine emotion, i.e., a cognitively evaluative judgment of                             
one’s personal achievements. Consider cases of success regarding individuals                 
7 
who were born into “old money.” Are these individuals feeling prideful for their                         
entrepreneurial accomplishments even though they seem fully competent enough                 
to recognize that the stage had already been set for them at birth? It seems far                               
more likely in this scenario that they are feigning pride to signal to others that                             
they are socially deserving of their wealth. Furthermore, even in cases where the                         
pride is sincere, it is not unlikely that someone who spends enough time telling                           
themselves that their success has been self-made might come to suppress any fact                         
to the contrary, thus leading to actual pride over time through temporally induced                         
self-deception. 
 
IV. Animal Rights on A Kantian Account 
  
As an advocate of duty-based, or deontological, ethics, Immanuel Kant’s                   
moral philosophy was concerned with the moral status of actions                   
in-and-of-themselves, rather than their outcomes or consequences. Kant believed                 
that morally right actions were to be distinguished from preferred actions and,                       
therefore, the theory is attractive in the sense that it does not fall victim to                             
arbitrary subjectivity. For Kant, morality is derived from what he took to be the                           
uniquely human capacity for both autonomy and reason. From this, Kant                     
concluded that moral principles of action are those that can be universalized                       
without incurring a practical contradiction concerning rationally autonomous               
agents. In ​Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals ​, Kant presents the categorical                       
imperative. There are three distinct formulations of this supreme principle that                     
Kant offers, all of which he claims are logically the same. The principle worth                           
noting for the purposes of this argument is Kant’s Formula of Humanity, which is                           
his second formulation. This principle commands us to treat all rationally                     
autonomous agents as an end-in-itself and never as a mere means.   
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Kant’s moral philosophy has been foundational for grounding some                 
theories of basic human rights. This is because Kant’s Formula of Humanity                       
provides an understanding of the moral right by which basic human rights—such                       
as the right to life—can be grounded. However, given that Kant’s theory begins                         
from first principles concerning autonomy and reason, it has often been assumed                       
that non-human animals are not to be protected by right, as their instinctual and                           
conditioned existence lacks the necessary rational autonomy to include them in                     
the moral community. Kant himself once stated the following:  
 
18Immanuel Kant, ​Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals​, ed. Lara Denis, trans. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
8 
The fact that the human being can have the representation “I”                     
raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth. By this he                         
is a person…that is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity                       
from things, such as irrational animals, with which one may deal                     
and dispose at one’s discretion.   
19
 
Presently, our duties with regards to non-human animals reflect this                   
traditional line of thinking, as any protections granted to non-human animals are                       
indirect in nature. Non-human animals are still considered human property. For                     
example, if someone poisoned another’s outdoor cat, it would be a violation of the                           
owner’s property rights, not a violation of the cat’s rights. These same notions of                           
property can be problematic in regard to non-domesticated animals as well.                     
Wildlife living within the bounds of certain geographical coordinates are viewed                     
as the “property” of a wildlife preserve, national park, or at times, even property                           
of the state itself. 
Nevertheless, as previously shown, there is empirical evidence that                 
non-human animals emote. If this is so, and we apply this to Nussbaum’s                         
cognitivist theory of emotions, then we can grant that non-human animals engage                       
in cognitively evaluative judgments, which means that they have the capacity for                       
autonomous reason. For example, if an animal held against its will began to                         
20
express fear, as well as the relevant corresponding behavior, then it cognitively                       
possesses a judgment that might be linguistically interpreted as “my life is in                         
danger” (i.e., fear), as well as the corresponding will to act accordingly. In other                           
words, it is engaging with autonomous reason. ​Therefore, the rational nature of                       
fear suggests that non-human animals hold a rationally vested interest in their                       
safety, and thus imposing on this would violate the principle of treating such                         
agents always as an end-in-themselves and never as a mere means. 
Nussbaum’s defense of a non-human animal’s ability to emote suggests                   
that non-human animals can make evaluative judgments as rational agents,                   
allowing us to view cases of non-human animal fear for what it is: a cognitively                             
evaluative judgment concerning some imposing threat, which can include, but is                     
not limited to, the integrity of one’s own bodily autonomy. Therefore, given that                         
non-human animals have rationally vested interests, as expressed in certain cases                     
of fear on the cognitivist account, we can conclude on a deontological framework                         
that non-human animals require limited-protections in the form of rights, as                     
non-human animals possess all the qualifications necessary for consideration. 
19See Kant, ​Lectures on Anthropology​, 7, 127. 
20It’s worth noting here that unlike Tom Regan, whose deontological approach dispenses with the                           
criterion of rationality, this argument aims to preserve this criterion. For more on Regan’s                           




V. Moving Forward: What Does This Rights-based Inclusion Mean for Both 
Non-Human And Human Animals? 
 
Inspired by a cognitivist account of emotion, it is not just human life, but                           
emotionally cognitive life that entails the capacity for reason. This is because                       
some non-human animals have the capacity for emotional behavior, leading to the                       
rational effectuation of their will in accordance with evaluative judgments. Upon                     
this recognition, we ought to change the way we currently view some non-human                         
animals by acknowledging and respecting their moral agency as rationally                   
self-determined ends-in-themselves. This will mean granting them the same moral                   
grounds necessary for a limited scope of basic rights.  
As rational agents that hold interests in their own bodily autonomy, it is                         
only logically necessary that we extend the same moral basis for human rights in                           
this regard to the arbitrary use and/or disposal of non-human persons. This                       
revision of the moral status of non-human animals might suggest a legal                       
abolishment of the use of animals for agricultural pursuits, ultimately making the                       
institution of factory farming obsolete. Similarly, laboratory testing on                 
non-human animals might also be banned, as using non-human animals as                     
research subjects against their own will violates their rational autonomy. Lastly,                     
trophy hunting would likely be prohibited as well, along with any hunting for                         
purposes other than one’s own impending survival. 
These legal provisions would require a significant reconfiguration of our                     
current agricultural, research, and recreational practices. Such changes would                 
require immense federal effort as well as support in the public sphere both                         
legislatively and monetarily to get things off the ground; this challenging reality                       
does not go unnoticed. Nevertheless, a shift in our perspective towards viewing all                         
emotionality as rational may provide us with the motivation to respect the dignity                         
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